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hey are getting nothing for their work"'
When U. S. Representative William I. Sirovich (R-
NY) uttered these words in 1932, he decried the
situation of musical performers who, under United
States copyright law, were not afforded direct
compensation for the public performance of sound
recordings that they created. If Rep. Sirovich were
alive today, he might express a similar reaction, as
there has been little legislative progress in securing
direct remuneration to performers and record
companies in exchange for broadcasters' public
performance of sound recordings.
To illustrate the absence of a general
performance right in sound recordings, consider
Frank Sinatra's rendition of Come FlyWith Mewritten
byJimmyVan Heusen and Sammy Cahn.2 Under the
Copyright ActVan Heusen and Cahn are authors of
the "musical-work:' and are entitled to a royalty each
time the song is performed publicly.3 ("Public
performance" is defined broadly, including
performances, whether live or recorded, in a bar or
hotel lounge, on TV, over FM or AM radio, and so
on.) Under U.S. copyright law, neither Sinatra, the
performer of the sound recording, nor Capitol
Records, his record label, is entitled to a royalty for
the public, broadcast of the Come Fly With Me
recording, unless it is performed digitally over the
Internet or on satellite radio.4 Additionally, neither
Sinatra nor Capitol receives a royalty for the
recording's broadcast in one of the many countries
that does grant full performance rights; such
jurisdictions condition the right on reciprocal legal
treatment by the performers' and copyright owners'
home country.
5
The canon of legal scholarship on this subject
is quite broad, with numerous observers having
addressed the lack of a general public performance
right in sound recordings.6 Most do so from a
decidedly opinionated point of view, denouncing the
right's absence as "illogical," 7 a "failure,"8 and an
"economic injustice: '9 while referring to adoption
of a general performance right as "long overdue."'"
There is no known piece of domestic legal
scholarship defending the status quo.
This battle has extended beyond the halls
of academia. Since 1926, over twenty-five bills seeking
to grant a full public performance right in sound
recordings have been presented, without success, in
the U.S. Congress." Some observers, however, hail
the 1995 adoption of a digital performance right in
sound recordings as a significant advancement for
sound recording copyright owners and artists.1
2
Nevertheless, as recently as 2002, a legal scholar
made a spirited call for a "full" or "general" public
performance right in sound recordings. 3
Rather than approaching the issue from a
position of advocacy, this paper explores the status
and merit of a full sound recording performance
royalty. It does so by focusing on the positions of
the three leading stakeholders in the debate: record
labels, recording artists,
and radio broadcasters.
First, in Part I, it describes
the current state of the
public performance right
in the United States,
concluding that 
to,
regardless of legislative s n r d
enactments in the mid-
and late-I 990s, there has o
been no significant net
gain in performance
rights for owners of sound recording copyrights.
With that background in place, the paper explores
in Part II the possibility that the right's nonexistence
is due to a lack of merit in the right itself. It concludes
that arguments advanced by supporters of the right
are not as strong as their exuberance suggests and
that actions taken by the recording industry during
the digital performance debates of the 1990s give
the broadcasting industry a reasonable basis for
maintaining opposition to a full performance right.
Thus, despite the seeming inequities of the current
situation, broadcasters' economic self-interest is
found not to be solely responsible for stifling the
development of a general performance right in sound
recordings. Nonetheless, under the current legal
framework, the balance is likely tipped in radio
broadcasters' favor; therefore, some realignment is
called for. Hoping to spawn further discussion of an
evenhanded solution to this nearly century-old
debate, the article concludes in Part III by outlining
the possible contours of a new performance right in
sound recordings.
Before exploring the merits of suggested
changes to U.S. law regarding the public performance
right in sound recordings, it is necessary to detail
the current state of relevant music copyright law.
This investigation is particularly important
considering two related developments in the 1990s
that, by some accounts, represent an advancement
towards securing a general public performance right
in sound recordings. The discussion begins by
exploring the two basic interests in a recorded piece
of music: the musical composition and the sound
recording.
Within its definition of the subject matter
of copyright, the U.S. CopyrightAct includes "musical
works," also known as"musical compositions" ' 4 The
author of a musical composition is the songwriter,
who often transfers his rights in a work to a music
publisher in exchange for a percentage of royalties
derived from the use of that work."5 As owner of
the copyright, the publisher may then authorize the
reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and public
performance of the musical work. 6 Although not
directly a topic of this paper, it is important to
understand the structure of the musical composition
copyright, as it has long included a general right of
public performance. The structure and operation of
the musical composition copyright have served as
reference points for advocates seeking to expand
the same public performance right to copyright
owners and performers of sound recordings.
I. Limited Rights of
Reproduction and Distribution
Composers typically make their living by
having their works recorded and brought to the
public by one or more performers. 7 When an artist
wishes to make a recording of a musical work which
she did not compose and for which she does not
hold the copyright, the composition owner's rights
of reproduction and distribution are implicated."
That is, by recording and selling a compact disc (or,
in the words of the Copyright Act, a "phonogram"), 9
the recording artist is both reproducing the musical
work in a fixed medium and distributing that work
to the public.
At one point in time, most musical
compositions were distributed and reproduced via
the printing and sale of sheet music.20 Such was the
case until the 1880s, when the first popular means
of "recording" a song emerged with the invention of
the player piano and piano rolls." Responding to
widespread public demand, music publishers began
granting licenses for the reproduction of their songs
on piano rolls.2 Manufacturers of piano rolls
recognized the economic benefit of purchasing such
licenses on an exclusive basis, and by the first decade
of the next century, the Aeolian Piano Roll Company
had nearly monopolized that market.23 The free
exercise of the reproduction right by one powerful
industry, the music publishers, and the accumulation
of those rights by another powerful actor, theAeolian
Company, threatened to upset the developing market
for recorded music.24
Emerging as the "most controversial issue"
2
of the 1909 Copyright Act, the Aeolian Company's
growing market share and the collusion of music
publishers forced Congress to seek a delicate balance
that would honor music publishers' freedom of
contract "without establishing a great music
monopoly. ' 26 With this task in mind, Congress
adopted what is known as a "mechanical" or
''statutory" license for certain uses of musical
compositions. Although the musical composition
owner may choose to prohibit any mechanical
reproduction of his work, once he has authorized
the first recording for public distribution, the statute
requires him to grant a license "upon request to any
other person who proposes to make and distribute
phonorecords of the work, at a royalty rate set by
law "' 27 In other words, once a composer allows one
artist to record the song, he must allow any artist to
record it. The composer then earns a mechanical
or statutory royalty for every recording that is sold.
Record companies and composers do not individually
negotiate this licensing rate. Instead, the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, an independent agency created by
Congress, is charged with the task of periodically
revising the statutory mechanical rate.
28
In recent years, annual mechanical royalty
payments to composers and publishers have totaled
nearly $700 million. 9 While the mechanism for
distributing mechanical license royalties can be
complex, 0 its importance here is to highlight
Congress's ability to alleviate concerns of one
industry's potentially dominating use of a particular
exclusive right. Note
that Congress chose a
moderate solution,
rejecting calls to refuse
the right of mechanical
m froM reproduction altogether
i i as well as those
advocating a right
S rwithout limits. It did so
by limiting an otherwise
r s ~exclusive right via a
statutory license and
was able to further
ensure equitable
remuneration and harmony through use of an
independent royalty tribunal.
2. Exclusive Rights of Public
Performance
The owner of the copyright in a musical
work (i.e., composer or publisher) has exclusive
control over the right to "perform the copyrighted
work publicly."' 3' The definition of "public
performance" 32 is broad, covering live performances,
as well as broadcast by radio, television, Internet,
satellite, and in any place "open to the public."33 As
a result, the right of public performance is "one of
the most significant sources of income from a musical
composition" 34with radio broadcasting providing the
greatest single source of performance revenue to
songwriters.
The public performance right has its origins
in nineteenth century Europe, where it was applied
to operettas and other dramatic works.36 Before
the right's adoption in the United States, several







production.3 8 By failing
to prevent the
unauthorized public
performances of musical i
works, the U.S. lagged
behind its European
counterparts for many
years. As a result, the development of musical works
in the U.S. suffered serious ramifications. As one
author has explained:
[When Britain's Gilbert and Sullivan
exported productions of their
popular operettas to the United
States, American producers
purchased quantities of opening
night seats for stenographers who
transcribed the dialog. With a legally
purchased copy of the musical score
and a transcribed dialog, a producer
could have his own production of a
Gilbert and Sullivan show on stage
within weeks - and without any
payment to Gilbert and Sullivan. 9
In 1897, the U.S. finally granted the right of public
performance for literary works, including musical
compositions.40 It is interesting to note that owners
of sheet music did not initially exercise the right, as
they believed that the public performance of their
works promoted sales of sheet music. 4
1
The prevailing view among composers and
publishers soon changed, and they desired to exercise
the new performance right assiduously. They faced
a problem, however, in that the right is, of course,
not self-enforcing.4" In 1914, recognizing the practical
improbability of individual copyright owners engaging
in direct negotiation with multiple users of their
works,43 "composers of every kind and condition of
music and every big music publishing concern" met
to form theAmerican Society of Composers,Authors
and Publishers (ASCAP) 4 ASCAP "intended to
prevent the playing of all copyrighted music at any
public function unless a royalty was paid. '4 In 1939,
a similar performing rights organization (PRO),
Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI), was formed.46 A third
and much smaller PRO, the Society of European Stage
Authors and Composers (SESAC), initially focused
on gospel music but has since expanded its
repertoire.47
By all accounts, the advent of the PRO concept
has been a success, with current royalty collection
estimates at over $1 billion per year.48 Virtually"every
domestic copyrighted composition" 49 may be found
in the ASCAP and BMI repertories, with "billions""0
of performances authorized each year. The two
organizations,through their efficient policing of radio
and television broadcasts, collect over 99 percent of
domestic public performance royalties for musical
works.5  There is little doubt that the PROs play an
integral role in securing valuable public performance
royalties for owners of copyrights in musical
compositions. By all accounts, the system has been
"remarkably successful'- 2
In terms of the licensing system, music users
such as radio stations will typically negotiate a blanket
license with one of the PROs. 3 This license allows
users "the right to perform any and all of the
compositions owned by the members or affiliates




For most large users, fees for the blanket license are
based on a percentage of the organization's total
revenues." For example, during the years 1996-2000,
ASCAP negotiated with broadcasters a rate of 1.615
percent for stations having annual gross revenue over
$ 150,000.6 Generally, this fee amounts to 3.5
percent of radio broadcaster revenue. 7 Fees are
then distributed to the PRO's member-composers.
Although the system for determining individual
distributions can be complex, 8 it is helpful to note
the guiding principle that"royalty distributions made
to members for performances in each licensed
medium should reflect the license fees paid by or
attributable to users in that medium "59
Faced with the rising importance of the PRO
in the 1940s, licensees expressed concern about their
bargaining power vis-A-vis ASCAP (and later BMI).
To address potential antitrust concerns, the U.S.
Department of Justice entered into consent decrees
with both of the leading PROs.60 Although one could
write a rather lengthy analysis of the consent decrees,
for purposes of this discussion, the most pertinent
factor is the designation of "rate courts" to adjudicate
disputes over rates to be charged for use of works
in the PRO repertories. Basically, if the user and
PRO cannot agree on a "reasonable rate" the user
may appeal for a determination by the rate court,
and if the PRO is unable to establish that the fee it
requested is reasonable, then the rate court "shall




In considering the administration of public
performance rights in musical compositions, it is
helpful to draw a comparison to the mechanical
license system limiting the reproduction and
distribution rights in the same medium. As discussed
earlier in Part I.A. I, Congress created that limitation
on an otherwise exclusive right to control the
potentially abusive practices of large stakeholders.
With the public performance right, observers were
wary of similar power on the part of the two major
collective licensors. Faced with a structure that could
have enabled anticompetitive practices by the PROs,
the antitrust authorities crafted a public performance
copyright system that balances the need of music
users for access to a vast repertoire with the interest
of composers and publishers in receiving adequate
compensation. A common theme in the
governmental responses to the reproduction,
distribution, and public performance markets for
musical compositions is a regulatory compromise
that does not, on its face,favor one stakeholder
over others. As will be
discussed in Part II.B.2.b,
the recording industry, in
calling for a general public
performance right in
sound recordings,
appears willing to ignore
this important balancing




by continuing to advocate that there be no significant
performance right in sound recordings.
The Copyright Act does not afford owners
of sound recording copyrights the same level of
protection that it grants to owners of musical works.
Nevertheless, despite voluminous criticism in the
academic literature regarding this disparity, it is
important to note that owners of sound recording
copyrights do receive significant protection under
U.S. copyright law. Specifically, they are entitled to
rights of distribution and reproduction, a limited
adaptation right, and the right of public performance
by digital means.62
I. Exclusive Right of
Reproduction
Of pivotal importance to the American
recording industry, the reproduction right held by
sound recording copyright owners is relatively young
when compared to the nearly 200 year-old
reproduction right enjoyed by copyright owners of
musical compositions.63 Recording industry
supporters fought a long and hard legislative battle
to obtain the exclusive right of reproduction in sound
recordings, culminating in a 1971 amendment to the
Copyright Act.64
In extending reproduction protection to
sound recording copyright owners, Congress cited
the "widespread" growth of record piracy, estimated
at the time to be costing the industry at a level equal
to twenty-five percent the value of all legitimate
sales. 6  Congress decried the availability of
unauthorized cassettes "in gasoline stations, truck
stops, highway rest areas, convenience stores, and
other outlets that had never carried legitimately
recorded music:'6 6 Recognizing the inequity of the
sound recording owners' position compared to that
of the music publishers, the accompanying House
report to the 1971 Amendment complained that
"there is no Federal remedy currently available to
combat the unauthorized reproduction of [a]
recording."' 67 Therefore, to protect record
companies' "principal source of revenue" against
significant erosion, Congress adopted the exclusive
right of reproduction in sound recordings.'
Indeed, of the exclusive rights currently
vested in sound recordings, the most valuable is the
right to control the reproduction of a sound
recording. The sale of sound recordings amassed an
estimated $11.55 billion for the recording industry
in 2002 alone.6 9 Through a process known as
"synchronization,' 7 additional revenues are
generated whenever a sound recording is
reproduced in conjunction with an audiovisual
presentation, as is often the case in a movie or
television show. In opposing a general performance
right, radio broadcasters have pointed to this large
volume of American sound recording sales and the
income it produces.
2. Longstanding Absence of a
General Public Performance
Right
Despite Congress's enthusiastic support for
an uninhibited and exclusive reproduction right in
sound recordings, the accompanying House Report
to the reproduction Amendment was dismissive of
calls for a performance right in those same sound
recordings." In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress
reaffirmed this decision, specifying in section I 14(a)
that"[t]he exclusive rights of the owner of copyright




not to gain the general
right of public e






years after enactment of
section 114(a), the
domestic recording of a iimat
industry made no official
effort to obtain a performance right in sound
recordings.74 Then, after launching a vigorous
legislative effort in 1993, sound recording copyright
owners seemed to have a reason to celebrate when
Congress passed the Digital Performance Rights in
Sound Recordings Act (DPRA) in 1995.71 The Act
granted an exclusive right of public performance for
digital broadcasts transmitted by interactive services,
defined as those enabling "a member of the public
to receive, on request, a transmission of a particular
sound recording. 76 Also, it created a right of
remuneration for digital performances transmitted
by noninteractive subscription services, but limited
that right by granting broadcasters of such services
the right to a new compulsory license.77 Subject to
the same compulsory license,the digital performance
right was expanded to include noninteractive
nonsubscription services when Congress passed the
Digital Millennium CopyrightAct (DMCA) in 1998.78
(a) Description of the Digital
Performance Right
According to the legislative history, Congress
enacted the DPRA to ensure that performing artists
and record companies are protected from changes
in the way consumers use sound recordings.
79
Describing digital recordings in compact discs (CDs)
as the "dominant physical medium for the distribution
of copyrighted sound recordings,"80 Congress
expressed concern that at least a"small number" of
services were making transmissions of digital
recordings available to subscribers via the Internet."
Although pleased that this phenomenon would
"permit consumers to enjoy performances of a
broader range of higher-quality recordings,"
Congress worried that the "streaming" of online
music could "obviate the need for consumers to buy
anything physical in their quest to obtain digital quality
music recordings.'8
Of greatest concern to Congress was the
so-called "celestial jukebox:' an interactive service
whereby Internet users could select "on-demand"









and record companies whe
depend upon such sales j$i
as their primary source
of revenue, the DPRA (DPRA) i 9
grants sound recording
copyright owners an
exclusive right to control
the use of sound recordings via interactive digital
services.8"
Less troubling but still of some concern to
Congress was the emergence of non-interactive
webcasts. 6 These services operate much like
traditional radio broadcasts, in the sense that the
consumer does not control which sound recordings
are aired. Since these webcasting services were in
short supply at the time of passage of the DPRA
and DMCA, it was difficult for Congress to gauge
what effect they might have on the traditional
revenue streams of recording companies and
artists.817 Congress was thus more attuned to the
arguments of songwriters, who expressed concern
that an exclusive license could "limit opportunities
for the performance of musical works." Accordingly,
the DPRA and DMCA make noninteractive webcasts,
whether of a subscription or nonsubscription nature,
eligible for a compulsory webcasting license under
which the owner of the sound recording copyright
must license its work at a predetermined rate. 9
In the event that sound recording copyright
owners and noninteractive webcasters are unable
to agree upon a fee for use of the webcasting license,
the Librarian of Congress is directed to convene a
copyright arbitration royalty panel (CARP) to set a
rate per a "willing buyer, willing seller" standard.9"
The CARP is also responsible for establishing a
minimum fee for use of the webcasting license.9'
Both findings are subject to review by the Librarian
of Congress, who may reject the CARP's
determinations if found to be arbitrary or contrary
to law.92 As a result of the CARP process, webcasters
willing to pay the set fee may make digital,
noninteractive transmissions without having to
negotiate license fees with sound recording copyright
owners.
93
In February 2002, the first CARP announced
its findings for the webcasting license. By all accounts,
the proceedings were acrimonious.9 4 While much
could be written about the CARP, for purposes of
this discussion it is most important to note that the
panel was decidedly in favor of rate proposals put
forth by the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA), rather than those of the
webcasters9 A key example of the RIAA's success
is the panel's decision as to the metric for calculating
royalty rates. The webcasters requested the option
of a percentage-of-revenue license equal to three
percent of gross revenues. This figure,they explained,
was "taken straight from the ASCAP/BMI/SESAC
broadcast radio licenses [for the public performance
of musical compositions]. ' 96 The RIAA, however,
objected, requesting that the CARP set a per-
performance fee of .4 cents per individual listener
reached.97
The CARP found that under a true "willing
buyer/willing seller" approach, the RIAA's per
performance measure would be more accurate.98
According to the CARP, such a measure reflects that
which is actually being used, because "the more
intensively an individual service uses the rights being
licensed, the more that service shall pay, and in direct
proportion to the usage."99 The CARP did not
directly respond to the historic example set by
ASCAP and BMI, despite the fact that both PROs
employ a percentage-of-revenue model in setting fees
for the use of a blanket license, and both are subject
to a "reasonableness" determination in a rate court
per their respective antitrust decrees.00
In its review of the CARP's determination,
the Librarian of Congress made certain changes to
the proposed rates, yet nevertheless maintained the
overall per-performance structure.' Rates for use
of the statutory webcasting license are calculated at
.07 cents per performance, per listener.0 2 Also, the
statutorily mandated minimum fee is set at $500.'03
The Librarian's decision set off a firestorm of
opposition, with the webcasting advocacy group
Digital Media Association (DiMA) proclaiming that
the RIAA was not "seriously interested in royalty
rates that will enable thousands of small webcasters
to survive, or that will enable music lovers to
continue enjoying... [a] diverse Internet radio
experience. 04
Reacting to the massive political fallout, the
RIAA agreed in October 2002 to accept a
percentage-of-revenue royalty rate of eight percent
of gross revenues, or five percent of expenses
(whichever is greater) for those webcasters with
gross revenues of less than $1,000,000 during the
period from October 28, 1998, to December 3 1,
2002. 10s The recording industry made similar, yet
slightly more complicated, provisions for royalty
payments by small webcasters during the 2003-04
term. 0 6 The agreement was approved by Congress
and codified via the Small Webcaster SettlementAct
of 2002.' SoundExchange, the nonprofit
organization established by the recording industry
to collect its public performance royalties, avoided
another CARP for the 2003-04 term by reaching a
separate agreement with larger webcasters in April
2003.08
(b) The Net (In)significance of the
Digital Performance Right
Although the new digital performance right
is important in some respects, its significance has
surely been overstated. While attempting to secure
passage of the digital performance right, some
members of the recording industry proclaimed the
DPRA and DMCA as momentous achievements in
the field of performance rights law.0 9 As one
journalist explained, the recording industry's attitude
could be paraphrased as, "this medium poses a
dramatic risk to everything we do. Those old laws
were always ridiculous.., and here is a chance to
make things right.""10
In fact, though,the DPRA and DMCA create
"critical limitations" on the public performance






exempt from the public
performance right even
if made in digital form, so
long as they are free tothe ay on- consumers. 11 3  One
cannot reasonably see
the DPRA and DMCA,
with all their limitations,
as significant expansions
of the public performance right to the realm of sound
recordings. Recall that the Copyright Act of 1976
created five particular rights in a copyrightable work,
one of which was the public performance right. It
codified these rights in five paragraphs of section
106 ofTitle 17 of the U.S. Code. As discussed earlier
in Part I.B.2, sound recordings were specifically
exempted from the public performance right of
section 106(4). The DPRA and DMCA did not
remove that exemption; rather, the digital
performance right exists at an entirely new
paragraph, section 106(6). These separate
classifications are not insignificant. By referring to a
public performance right for a "digital audio
transmission" a term lacking in any precedent in
copyright law, Congress signaled that a "qualitatively
new right is being created.""1
14
One prominent commentator, David
Nimmer, has explained that but for the advent of
the digital transmission of sound recordings,
Congress would not have seen fit to confer any new
public performance right.'" The legislative history
supports his assertion. For example, the Senate
report to the DPRA explicitly rejects a call by the
then-Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, that




recordings into line with
the protection afforded
to the creators of other
works" 16
In light of the
structure and history of
the DPRA and DMCA,
sound recording
copyright owners and
artists are intended to
receive no greater
royalty compensation than that to which they were
entitled under the traditional analog system, which
depended entirely upon revenues from the exclusive
rights to reproduce and distribute sound
recordings.'"' This principle of"substitution' 8 which
seeks to compensate sound recording owners and
artists solely for phonogram sales dollars lost to new
distribution technologies, explains why the DMCA
and DPRA may represent a net gain of zero for the
sound recording industry."9 Congress meant only
to avoid substitution effects; it "did not contemplate
providing copyright owners a windfall."'*2
There is a final piece of evidence indicative
of the digital performance right's aggregate
insignificance. As discussed further in Part II.A. I, since
the introduction of the Rome Convention in 1961,
supporters of a new performance right have pointed
to the presence of the general performance right in
other countries as justification for domestic adoption
thereof. Specifically, supporters cite the fact that
these countries grant the right to foreign works only
on the condition of reciprocal treatment by the
copyright owner's home country. As one journalist
succinctly put it, "U.S. artists do not get royalties
when their music is performed on foreign radio
stations, just as non-U.S. artists don't get money for
when their songs hitAmerican radio."" ' Yet neither
the DPRA nor the DMCA will make much of a
difference in this respect. As Professor Nimmer has
explained, had Congress wished to maximize foreign
revenue to its recording industry constituents, "it
would have followed the Copyright Office's
recommendation and simply extended the blanket
performance right to sound recordings" 22 Although
some legislators and observers may have thought
that the laws of 1995 and 1998 would alleviate losses
suffered by domestic sound recording owners in
foreign markets, 23 the new digital right was far too
narrow to trigger reciprocal treatment abroad. 24
Considering the distinct nature of the digital
performance right in sound recordings, it appears
that no significant progress has been made in attaining
a general public performance right in sound
recordings. One possibility for this phenomenon is
that the right is not warranted, a possibility explored,
and only partially rejected, in the following section.
As mentioned in the Introduction, there is a
wealth of scholarly, journalistic, and governmental
literature calling for the adoption of a general public
performance right in sound recordings. Among the
justifications offered are a desire for international
harmonization of the copyright laws, loss of potential
royalties abroad, creation of incentives for the
production of new and unique recordings, and basic
notions of equity between composers and recording
artists. Opponents of the right, however, have
advanced the notion that artists and sound recording
owners are already justly compensated by the
promotional effect that radio airplay has on record
sales. They also argue that a general performance
right would bankrupt the broadcasting industry and
that the social costs attendant to the new
performance right may
skew the optimal balance
between the creation
and use of intellectual
property. Each line of
argument, both pro and
con, speaks to a
fundamental question: Is
there merit to a general
public performance right
in sound recordings? To
answer this crucial
question, it is necessary
to consider the various
arguments, pro and con,
in further detail.
I. Concerns of the
International Market Support
a Public Performance Right
In recent years, numerous Copyright Act
revisions have been made in the name of the
international harmonization of copyright laws. In
1976, for example, one of the major justifications
for Congress in adopting a life-of-the-author plus
fifty year copyright term was to "align... United
States copyright terms with the then-dominant
international standard."'25 Adding an additional
twenty years to that term, the subsequent
Congressional decision to enact the CopyrightTerm
Extension Act (CTEA) sought to "harmonize... the
baseline United States copyright term with the term
adopted by the European Union in 1993 "'126
Appealing to that goal of harmonization,
supporters of a general public performance right in
sound recordings claim that the right's adoption
would bring U.S. law in-line with that of our neighbors
abroad. The title of a recent scholarly article on the
subject sums up the argument well:"Dancing to the
Beat of a Different Drummer: Global Harmonization
- and the Need for Congress to Get in Step with a
Full Public Performance Right for Sound
Recordings.' 2 7 Similarly, a Billboard editorial carried
the moniker, "U.S. Should Get in Step with Other
Nations; The Case for a Performance Royalty." ' 8
Many other commentators have used international
harmonization as justification for U.S. adoption of a
general performance right in sound recordings.'
As specific proof that adoption of the right
would harmonize U.S. law with that of the global
marketplace, supporters point to the Rome
Convention, formally known as the International
Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations.' The only international treaty
governing performers' rights in sound recordings,
the Rome Convention has been in force since
1961 ' The Convention requires signatories to grant
equitable remuneration to either performers or
producers of sound recordings, or both. Specifically,
Article 12 states that:
If a phonogram published for
commercial purposes, or a
reproduction of such phonogram, is
used directly for broadcasting or for
any communication to the public, a
single equitable remuneration shall
be paid by the user to the
performers, or to the producers of
the phonograms, or to both.
Domestic law may, in the absence
of agreement between these parties,
lay down the conditions as to the
sharing of this remuneration. 132
Although an active participant in its drafting,
the U.S. neither signed nor ratified the Rome
Convention.' In the last two decades, however,
there has been a rapid increase in the number of
states seeking membership in the Convention.14 As
of October 2003, 76 countries were signatories to
the Rome Convention. 35
Rights under the Rome Convention are
commonly known as "neighboring rights:' granted
to foreign countries only on a reciprocal, as opposed
to national, basis. 36 Thus, only those sound recording
owners and performers who are nationals of a Rome
Convention member country receive performance
rights in other member countries.3 7 Given this
structure, advocates point to the fact that were the
U.S. to become a party to the Rome Convention, it
would be entitled to reciprocal treatment and would
accordingly receive performance royalties when
sound recordings owned by U.S. nationals are
performed within the jurisdiction of member
states."'38 Those advocating for a general performance
right point out that without it,"American recording
artists and record labels are not entitled to receive
the millions of dollars in foreign royalties collected
that would otherwise be payable."' 39 In other words,
as another commentator explained,"what moves this
issue forward is [a] significant amount of money."'4°
On the surface, it appears that the U.S. has
a compelling profit motive to desire membership in
the Rome Convention's reciprocal rights regime.
Estimates as to the amount of money at stake vary,
but they all predict vastly increased riches for
performers and record labels. For example, a 1990
estimate suggested thatAmerican performers were
then losing $27 million per year due to the lack of
U.S. membership in the Convention. 14' Even if an
exact estimate of potential performance royalties
lost is not available, it is easy to infer a large number
from the fact that over sixty percent of foreign
record sales are of albums made by Americans. 42
In view of the steadily increasing number of
signatories, it is tempting to conclude that U.S.
accession to the Rome Convention would promote
the goal of international
harmonization and
would reap a substantial
a ofinancial windfall for U.S.
performers and- producers of sound
recordings. Such would
be the case were it not
SUlfor a little-referenced




Any State, upon becoming party to
this Convention, shall be bound by
all the obligations and shall enjoy all
the benefits thereof. However, a
State may at any time, in a
notification deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United
Nations, declare that as regards
Article 12, it will not apply the
provisions of that Article1
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Twelve states thus far have exercised their
right to opt-out of Article 12 performance rights
obligations. 44 One cannot ignore the opt-out factor
in considering the effect of future U.S. membership
in the Rome Convention. That is, many countries,
especially those with comparatively small domestic
recording industries, would likely not have entered
the Rome Convention's reciprocal rights regime if
doing so would have triggered a large outflow of
new royalty payments to U.S. sound recording
copyright owners.
To illustrate the limitation of a pro-
performance right argument relying on reciprocal
compensation, it is helpful to consider a few selected
country examples. First are two states, the United
Kingdom and France, which are considered to be
firm participants in Article 12, unlikely to waiver from
their participation decision. Both are major
recording industry leaders. 4 Since a landmark court
decision in 1934, the U.K. has recognized a right of
public performance in sound recordings.'46 The U.K.
recording industry is strong, with sales of £1. 155
billion (approximately $2.08 billion) in the four
quarters preceding September 30,2003. 14 Although
France did not officially enact a legislative public
performance right in sound recordings until 1985,148
it too has a long history of honoring performance
rights in sound recordings.'49 Also like the U.K.,
France has a strong domestic recording industry. Its
is the fifth largest in the world, with sales of over
7.379 billion francs (approximately $1.05 billion) in
2000.150
Yet the U.K. and France are not typical Rome
Convention signatories. Most participants, in fact,
have comparatively small domestic recording
industries, and would thus incur a royalty imbalance
with the U.S. following American adoption of the
Convention. For example, one of the Rome
Convention's most recent signatoriesII' is America's
largest trading partner, Canada.5 2 Although Canada
had previously adopted the right, it changed course
and removed the right in 197 1, partly in response to
broadcaster opposition.'53 Re-introduction of the
right in the 1990s was "highly controversial," and
occurred only after "extensive debate.'
5 4
Impact of the new Canadian performance
right is significantly limited by the fact that each
broadcaster need only pay annual royalties of $ 100
CAD ($76.80 USD) for the first $1.25 million CAD
($959,951 USD) in revenue'5 The legislative history
of the 1997 Act indicates that this safe harbor was
designed to mollify the fears of broadcasters. As
the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on
Transport and Communications has explained,"[t]his
preferential rate... cover[s] about 65 per cent of
Canadian radio stations."' s6 The Canadian situation
stands in stark contrast to that of the digital
performance right in the U.S., where a minimum fee
of $500 was imposed for use of the statutory
webcasting license regardless of a webcaster's
revenue stream.5 7 Consequently, the Canadian
example does not necessarily represent a"full" public
performance right in sound recordings.
In addition to the $ 100 CAD ceiling on fees
to be paid by the majority of broadcasters,American
observers should also be cognizant of the role that
U.S. non-participation in the Rome Convention
played in the Canadian decision to re-enact a
performance right in sound recordings. First, note
that one of the reasons for abolition of the right in
1971 was concern that America would join the
Convention, provoking in Canadian authorities a
"well-founded fear that most royalties would be paid
out to the United States, which exports large
numbers of recordings to Canada."'5 8 Both then and
now, U.S. copyright holders are estimated to own
more than fifty percent of all recordings publicly
performed in Canada.5 9 If the U.S. were to adopt
neighboring rights under the Rome Convention, a
large southern outflow of royalty payments would
be required of Canadian broadcasters. In fact,fearful
of reciprocal obligations for digital performances
under the DPRA and DMCA, the Canadian Standing
Senate Committee on Transport and
Communications advised:
[T]he U.S.will enforce "neighbouring
rights" related to digital radio
offered to consumers on a
subscription basis.Your Committee
therefore recommends that the
Government immediately
undertake an in-depth study of the
new digital technologies, in
particular the Internet, and the
impact their widespread commercial
deployment might have on the
payments Canadian broadcasters
may have to make to both Canadian
and foreign rights holders.
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It seems likely that U.S. adoption of a general
performance right in sound recordings would trigger
a retreat of recent Canadian copyright advances.
Specifically, the Canadian Parliament could be
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would serve the international harmonization goal
of American copyright law.
Like a Delphic sword, the reciprocity
argument cuts both ways. In explaining the role of
reciprocity under the Rome Convention (and citing
that role as incentive for U.S. adoption of a general
performance right in sound recordings), one
commentator has written that "[r]eciprocity
principles are a form of economic protectionism
employed in countries where imports of copyrighted
works far exceed exports"' 162 That observation is
correct, but a bit blunt. Reciprocity serves no
protectionist function for an economically self-
interested country if performance royalty eligible
imports far outpace exports, as would be the case
for many countries if the U.S. were to join the Rome
Convention's reciprocal rights regime. Hence,
perhaps the preceding statement could be rephrased
to say that under the Rome Convention,"reciprocity
principles are a form of economic protectionism
employed to avoid payment of performance royalties
to the U.S., a particularly large exporter of sound
recordings."
As advocates for a general performance right
in sound recordings are eager to point out,"United
States performers would reap the largest share of
the foreign performance rights royalties that have
been set aside so far."' 63 With such large prospective
payments to U.S. interests, however, it is hard to
ignore the possibility of defections from Article 12
by current member states. 64 There are far more
Rome signatories in the Canadian position, with a
comparatively weak domestic recording industry,
than there are countries like France and the U.K.,
which have relatively robust domestic industries."
6
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In some countries, it has been estimated that as many
as ninety percent of broadcasted sound recordings
are American-made. 66 Accordingly, the proposition
that U.S. adoption of the Rome Convention would
advance the goal of international copyright
harmonization and generate a substantial windfall
for U.S. performers and producers must be followed
by a disclaimer regarding the possibly disruptive
effects of U.S. participation in the treaty's reciprocity
scheme.
2. EquityDemands that Record-
ingArtists and Producers
Receive a Performance Right
Above and beyond economic notions,
proponents of a sound recording performance right
typically cite basic principles of equity as justification
for their position. Under this argument, there should
be a general performance right in sound recordings
because performers and record companies deserve
it. This stance dates back to the early days of the
performance rights debate. Congressman Sirovich,
for example, expressed concern in 1932 about the
lack of "protection to the author and manufacturer
who puts his talents or his money into the [sound
recording] without getting any compensation from
the others who are using it for commercial gain: '"" 7
The first branch of the equity-based
argument is of a comparative nature. It considers
the contribution to the finished product by, on the
one hand, performers and producers, and, on the
other, composers. Commentators of this view decry
the granting of a public
performance right to
"the person who puts
Srgthe words on paper and
the person who sets
a Jthose words to music,"
yet not to "the
performer who brings
that sheet music to life
nor to the record
company that invests
time, money, and artistry
to make that recording possible."'18 That is,"[b]oth
the performers and record companies... make a
creative contribution comparable to that of the
composer""'9
The comparative equity argument has some
force. Looking to popular culture, it is obvious that
consumers are often more interested in the
performer than the composer. Most teenagers, for
example, probably do not know the names Bruce
Robison and Farrah Braniff. They are certainly aware,
however, of the Dixie Chicks,"7 a pop-country
ensemble which last year took those composers'
work to the top of the Billboard charts. 7' Returning
to an earlier example, Old Blue Eyes (Frank Sinatra)
remains a household name, unlike his trusty
composer, Sammy Cahn. 172 As one advocate for a
new performance right has explained, in listening to
a song, "we are as much listening to it because of
that performer's skill and style as because of the
skill and style of the musical composer, lyricist, or
music publisher (who all receive performance
royalties).'
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While it is no
doubt inaccurate to view
the contribution of
artists and producers as
more important than that
of composers, there is t
certainly a "creative
interdependence" C
among the parties. 74 In
other words,"[a]bsent a
recording... the musical b
composition is silent" '75T
Given the importance of w
sound recordings to
music as we know it, r rig
there is a strong
equitable argument for
granting a performance right in sound recordings.
In addition to the role of the performer, of
course, there is the creative contribution of the
producer. It is the producer who acts as conductor
of the operation, putting together all the necessary
components, such as performers, composers, editors,
and arrangers. 7 ' Furthermore, much of the financial
risk in creating a sound recording is borne by the
record producer.'77 The producer is akin to a music
publisher, who typically receives half of all public
performance royalties for a musical composition.'78
The second prong to the fairness argument
is based on the idea of changed circumstances. Recall
the success of the recording industry in achieving
enactment of the digital performance right. That
accomplishment was almost entirely based on the
industry's ability to argue the effects of substitution.
As explained in Part I.B.2, supporters cited a desire
not for a net gain in revenue, but rather for the right
to simply "keep up" in light of a paradigm shift in the
use of music. This argument was of both an economic
and an equitable nature; Congress decided it was
not fair to allow performers and record companies
to suffer economically because of structural changes
in the industry. Though not achieving the same
success, a similar economic/equitable argument
emerged as early as the 1930s, when the recording
industry expressed growing concern that "a
performer's job [was] being replaced by the use of
his own recorded performance" 7 9 In a landmark
1978 report on the performance royalty question,
the Register of Copyrights wrote that"the transition
in the broadcasting industry from the use of 'live'
performances to recorded performances caused
severe dislocation in employment among
performers" ' "' Changed circumstances during the
twentieth century thus supported an equitable
argument that performers should be granted a
performance right in sound recordings. 8'
Despite the many historical changes in the
commercial use of sound recordings, Congress has
only ever addressed one such shift, that which
accompanied the Internet boom of the 1990s. Yet
unlike the limited digital performance royalty, a
general performance right in sound recordings could
serve as a cushion for artists and labels against the
extreme effects of unforeseen shifts in the use of
music. A general right would avoid the piecemeal
tactic employed in the DPRA and DMCA, which
bluntly attacked an emerging industry without
confronting the ongoing problem of a "free ride" for
traditional users of music, such as terrestrial radio
broadcasters.
The flip side of the equity argument holds
that although performers and producers are not
directly compensated, they nevertheless receive
sufficient remuneration from the promotional impact
of radio airplay, which in turn generates additional
record sales. The intricacies of this argument, and
specific responses by the recording industry, are
considered in Part ll.B. I.
3. A Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Would Serve
the Copyright Act's Incentive
Purpose
The Constitutional purpose of copyright law
is to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."' 8 2 Arising from the Copyright Clause is the
incentive rationale for copyright, whereby the grant
of a copyright monopoly provides authors the
incentive to create new works and ultimately benefits
the "progress of the arts and sciences" for the public
at large." 3 Under this principle, copyright laws should
be designed so as to encourage the production of
new works.
Congress has explicitly accepted the
incentive rationale for granting expanded copyright
protection. For example, in its controversial 1998
decision to extend the copyright term by twenty
years, Congress explained, "[e]xtending copyright
protection will be an incentive for U.S. authors to
continue using their creativity to produce works,
and provide copyright owners generally with the
incentive to restore older works and further
disseminate them to the public.' 8 4 While many
scholars have doubted the incentive effect of the
twenty year term extension,8" the important point
is that legislative leaders have relied on the rationale
in making significant amendments to the Copyright
Act
Some commentators have cited a public
performance right in sound recordings as serving
the incentive rationale of copyright law.
8 6 It is, of
course, difficult to measure the effect of the
performance right in stimulating the production of
new works. One cannot know what would or would
not be created if artists had more or less money. 87
Also, there is surely a diminishing marginal return
financially for those artists already at the top of their
field.8 I An extra few million dollars would do little
for an artist such as pop-megastar Madonna, who
already has all the economic incentive she might ever
need to produce new works. Yet for the many artists
who operate at the margin, a performance royalty
could provide the necessary income to prevent exit
from the recording business.'89 It is only logical to
assume that for artists living paycheck-to-paycheck,
even a modest performance royalty could spur the
ability and desire to produce new works. 90 At the
very least, the performing rights incentive argument
is as credible as the many other incentive-based
rationales found throughout U.S. copyright law.
Under a performance royalty regime, it is
also possible that record companies will have more
incentive to produce albums for artists who, without
the promise of a performance royalty, may not
generate enough sales to justify the economic risk
of production. Currently, most CDs sell very few
copies; the bulk of CD profits are generated from
the sale of a few very popular discs. 9' The major
record companies have concluded that a focus on
those few performers who can sell recordings in
large quantities is the most profitable strategy. 92 This




t industry.'93  The
introduction of a general
performance royalty,
however, could cause a
e shift in record
Ic companies' business




To the extent that American copyright law
is willing to accept incentive-based arguments (and
the experience of the CTEA shows that it is), one
must consider the fact that at least some new works
will be produced as a direct result of the performance
royalty. While this indeterminate promise of new
works may not, on its own, be sufficient to justify
enactment of a new performance royalty, it could
help tilt the scale in that direction. The contrary
argument, that copyright law must balance the social
benefits of the incentive stimulus against the resulting
diminution in public access to copyrighted material,
is discussed in Part ll.B.3.
I. Sound Recordings Owners
and Artists Already Receive
Adequate Compensation from
the Promotional Benefit of
Radio Compensation
The promotional effect of radio broadcasting
on sales of sound recordings has provided the
strongest justification for not enacting a general
performance right. Radio broadcasters do not




their works, but insist
that such compensation
already occurs indirectly t i 4o Posi
through the promotional h
benefit of "free airplay."
The broadcasters' wi





argument on its head.'
9 4
This position was perhaps best summed-up by James
Popham, an attorney for the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB), during congressional hearings
in 1975:
It is... the efforts of radio
broadcasters that are primarily
responsible for huge record sales
and huge audiences at recording
artists' concerts. We insure broad
exposure for creative work via
airplay of records, and thereby,
promote and stimulate the sale of
original artistry. We, too, insure
appropriate [rewards] for creative
endeavors and encourage additional
creative efforts by record
companies and recording artists."'
The current picture of the radio broadcasting
industry, rife with a practice known as "payola" gives
credence to broadcasters' promotional argument. 96
As such, a complete analysis of the performance right
debate cannot ignore the widespread presence of
payola in radio.
The phenomenon of "payola," or record
companies' directly paying rock n' roll DJs in
exchange for playing certain songs, peaked during
the I 950s and 60s and quickly scandalized the
American public. 97 Such direct pay-for-play was "a
routine part" of the music industry'" but was
ostensibly ended when outlawed by Congressional
action in 1960. 9 Not surprisingly, the industry found
a loophole, with record labels using a middleman to
achieve the same result. Under modern-day payola,
an independent promoter pays a set fee, generally
between $100,000 and $400,000,00 to create an
exclusive arrangement with a radio station under
which it will represent the station in relations with
record companies.2 0' Record companies, in turn, pay
the promoter, who is responsible for "suggesting"
songs to be played by its client radio stations.2 2
Labels typically pay between $800 and $5,000,
depending on market size, to a promoter for each
song added to a station's playlist.203 Nationwide, labels
will often spend from $200,000 to $300,000 for one
song's promotion, and at times may spend up to
$1,000,000.204
For purposes of the performance royalty
debate, the function and practice of payola reveals
the importance and value of radio airplay to the
recording industry's bottom line. In complaining
about the high cost of
payola, artists cite the
need for radio play as a
means to achieving b
record sales. For those
without financial means, a




practice in a song called
Crayola, singing that
"[p]ay for play is the only
way to get them
platinum plaques."2 '
One struggling artist told an ABC News reporter
investigating payola that "[r]adio's the standard for
music. That's where most people go to hear new
music
2 06
Legal commentators concur as to the
rationale for payola's existence. As a recent article
explained, "[a]lthough the practice of payment for
broadcast may seem inconceivable to listeners, the
reality of the high stakes music industry is that songs
must receive airplay if both the recording artist and
the record label are to survive."2 7 Professor Ronald
Coase, defending the practice in 1979, described
payola as a"price mechanism for efficiently allocating
this scarce but otherwise unpriced on-the-air
advertising of popular music.
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The fact that record companies, faced with
a recent downturn in sales, are seeking a reduction
in payola does not at all change the implication of
the practice on the performance royalty debate. They
complain only of paying "ever higher promotional
sums in an attempt to influence radio play, with
diminished results:' 20 9 Note that no label seeks an
actual diminishment of the ability to influence radio
airplay decisions. Rather, they hope for a more
economically efficient means to do so. Comments
of artists and legal observers all point to the same
reality: unless a new sound recording receives
significant airplay, it cannot hope to achieve equally
significant sales in record stores. The widespread
presence of payola strongly suggests that record
companies and artists receive a net promotional
benefit from the public broadcasting of new sound
recordings.
The recording industry has failed to respond
directly to the strong evidence, found in the
widespread practice of payola, that the public
broadcasting of sound recordings provides significant
promotional benefits. Nevertheless, the strength of
broadcasters' payola contentions are diluted by
certain countervailing factors. First is the issue, as
discussed in Part II.A.2, of equity. Also, relatively new
recordings are the only ones that receive a
promotional benefit. The following discussion
explores both factors and considers their effect on
the weight of broadcasters' promotional argument.
Supporters of a blanket performance right
in sound recordings often counter the promotional
argument by resorting to notions of equity. While
the argument is similar to that described above in
Part II.A.2, here it is more specific. Whether or not
record companies profit from radio airplay, it is
certainly the case that radio stations benefit as well.
For instance, in the Los Angeles market, year-end
radio advertising revenue for one recent year totaled
$846 million. °10 Advocates for a performance right
thus ask: where would radio be without sound
recordings?
It is demonstrably evident, as a matter of
logic, that terrestrial radio is benefiting from the use
of sound recordings without having to tender
payment for that right. The primary economic
motivation for traditional radio broadcasters in
playing music is income, not the beneficent
promotion of records. Note that it is advertising,
not payola, that provides radio broadcasters their
primary revenue stream. The advertisers, in turn,
pay for the attention of listeners, who tune-in to
hear music, not commercials. Without sound
recordings, this chain would be broken, and radio
broadcasters would suffer immense losses. As a radio
station manager in Los Angeles candidly testified to
Congress in 1975, "if it came to dropping ashtrays
and that was a very popular sound, [radio
broadcasters] would drop ashtrays."'I
As noted earlier, recording artists further
argue that even if there is a promotional effect to
broadcasting, that effect runs to the composers and
music publishers as well, who nevertheless receive a
public performance right.' II This contention, however,
is significantly weakened by the mechanical license
provisions of the Copyright Act. Recall that the
royalty paid to owners of musical compositions for
the reproduction of their works in recorded form is
capped at a specific amount.213 Owners of sound
recording copyrights, however, are not subject to
any statutory limitations for income generated
through album sales.2 14 Compensation from the
performance royalty in musical compositions thus
serves a legitimate purpose in narrowing that
regulatory gap.
Perhaps a stronger argument for the
recording industry is that older works, which
nevertheless may be widely broadcast, do not fit into
the rubric of promotion through public performance.
For example, while the Big Bopper's 1958 hit Chantilly
Lace '5 can be heard throughout the country on
countless oldies stations, there is, to be sure, no
payola being sent to those stations by the late artist's
record company, Mercury. Therefore, while many
listeners tune in to hear that and other such past
hits, there is little resulting promotional benefit to
sound recording copyright owners. The same holds
true for classical stations. They are unlikely to receive
payola for playing Glenn Gould's recording of J.S.
Bach's GoldbergVariations216 (sayVariation 20), and the
sound recording's public broadcast will lead to few,
if any, increased CD sales royalties for the Gould
estate and Sony Classical.
As an economic matter, older songs do not
receive the promotional benefit that may justify the
general lack of a performance right in sound
recordings. Once the promotional benefit diminishes,
the recording industry is left with a considerably
stronger argument in calling for a public performance
right in sound recordings.
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Faced with competing forces influencing the
merits of broadcasters' promotional arguments, a
unique compromise may be in order. When a sound
recording is in its adolescence, subject to massive
record sales spurred by widespread radio broadcast,
there may be no rational justification for affording a
"windfall" to labels and artists in the form of a public
performance royalty. Once that initial period has
passed, however, a right of equitable remuneration
should initiate.
Peter L. Felcher, a New York entertainment
lawyer, has suggested such a compromise. Under
his approach, the performance right would
commence five years after a record's initial release.
2 8
He reasons, "[t]he vast majority of broadcasters
playing a recording after five years will be stations
that had nothing to do with originally promoting
the recording, who are then doing nothing
particularly significant to increase anyone's income
other than their own. 1 1 9 While the appropriate
"grace period" for broadcasters is subject to debate,




the failings of arguments
put forth by both sides.
The current position of
a dbroadcasters ignores the
ephemeral nature of
coc airplay's promotional
benefit, while that of
sound recording
copyright owners fails to
recognize the initial value
of airplay. The most reasonable conclusion is that
any new public performance right in sound
recordings should be tempered by a statutory "safe
harbor" during that period in which sound recording
sales are most influenced by radio airplay.
2. A Performance Right Would
Bankrupt Radio Broadcasters
Radio broadcasters and similarly aligned
stakeholders contend that a general performance
right in sound recordings would be unduly
burdensome. Specifically, broadcasters argue that
with allegedly "substantial" payments totaling about
$300 million per year to composers and publishers,
they could not possibly afford additional performance
royalty obligations.22' To analyze the merit of the
undue burden contention, it is helpful to consider
past and present radio broadcasting industry
economic data.
The actual financial impact of a general
performance royalty on radio broadcasters is, of
course, difficult to estimate. It was for the 1978
report of the Register of Copyrights that an extensive
economic analysis of this subject was last published.22
The nature of radio, of course, has changed much
since then. Today, the industry is bigger and vastly
more consolidated. One large corporation, Clear
Channel Communications, with ownership of over
1,200 stations, reaches more than one-third of the
American population.223 It and the next nine largest
companies in radio embrace two-thirds of listeners
and revenue.2 4 At the local level, many markets are
dominated by four firms with control of over 70
percent of market share.2s The consolidation is the
result of changes enacted in theTelecommunications
Act of 1996 which dramatically deregulated rules
regarding ownership of multiple radio stations. 26
Radio stations have reaped great benefits
from the economies of scale achieved as a result of
consolidation. As one observer explained,"[o]wners
knew that if they could control more than one station
in a local market, they could consolidate operations
and reduce fixed expenses. Lower costs would mean
increased profit potential." '227 Clear Channel, for
example, grew from 40 stations before the 1996 Act
to 1,225 stations in 2003.228 In view of Clear
Channel's and other conglomerates' decision to
purchase thousands of radio stations, it is reasonable
to assume that the consolidated business of radio is,
in the long term, a profitable enterprise.
Even in the wake of the burst economic
"bubble" of the late 1990s, radio's financial health
remained in tact. For example, radio's total revenue
for 2002 increased by six percent over the 2001
figures, with purely local ad revenue up four percent
and national revenue jumping thirteen percent.
2 9
Radio remains financially strong, and in the past ten
years, radio revenue has grown steadily.230 It is
interesting to note that at the peak of the dot-con
bubble, radio revenue measured $19.848 billion, but
the four quarters preceding October 3 I, 2003 saw
an only slightly smaller figure of $19.575 billion.
23'
Moreover, radio's share of overall ad revenue is
growing in relation to other media, crossing for the
first time in recent years the eight percent media
market share barrier.23 2 And continued overall





a Ireaped by a remarkable
- ' consolidation of station
ownership and recent
0 figures showing steadily
increasing revenue, it
_ .appears that the radio
industry is poised for a
healthy future. The
imposition of some form
of new performance
royalty would therefore not cause significant financial
harm for the vast majority of radio broadcasters.
Rather, it would involve a change in the current
business model, requiring the radio conglomerates
to simply decide how best to absorb or pass on
added royalty costs. 34
There is a caveat. Although the industry can
certainly pay a royalty, it cannot pay at an
unconscionable rate. If the rate is set at a level and
structure similar to that of the public performance
royalty for musical compositions, as occurs in many
leading foreign countries,25 it is sensible to assume
that broadcasters can withstand the effects of new
performance fees (a reasonably modest $300 million
per year across the industry). 236 If, however, the
recording industry were to lobby for and obtain a










justified in assuming that
the recording industry
may seek unreasonable i V e
terms for a new
performance right, either
in the license structure
or in specific royalty rates.23 7 For example, in the
time between passage of the DPRA and DMCA, the
RIAA filed comments with the Copyright Office
urging that the recording industry, rather than the
government, should have the right to determine the
fees to be paid by webcasters 38 Given the RIAA's
suggestion that the rate be set at .4 cents per
individual listener reached, a number nearly six times
larger than the arguably high .07 cents rate adopted
by the Librarian of Congress, 39 webcasters were
correct to fear that the lack of a compulsory license
would have resulted in unconscionable fees. 24° Note
that a .4 cent fee would have cost a large webcaster
with an average audience of 40,000 listeners royalties
of approximately $23 million per year.24' Viewed
against a historical backdrop under which both
mechanical and musical composition performance
licensing terms have been successfully administered
under the tempering effect of a legislative or judicial
lever, the recording industry's request for unbridled
power in establishing webcasting rates bordered on
the inequitable.
2 42
After losing the compulsory license battle,
the RIAA did not retreat to a more reasonable
position. Although not as high as the amount officially
requested by the RIAA, the per-performance rate
adopted by the Librarian of Congress was, in some
cases, hundreds of times greater than the percentage-
of-revenue musical composition royalty required of
webcasters by ASCAP and BMI. 243 In the wake of
the Librarian's determination, hundreds of
webcasters ceased operations. While some faced
an uncertain future in any event, many attributed
their downfall to the high per-performance sound
recording royalty fees.44 Other webcasters sought
to survive by reincorporating abroad.24 As a result
of the closings and relocations, for the first time in
history, international webcasters now outnumber
channels based in the U.S.
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As noted in Part I.B.2.a, the RIAA ultimately
yielded and agreed to a percentage-of-revenue
formula for small webcasters.147 It is unlikely that
the industry would have capitulated but for an
onslaught of intense political pressure.2 48 Had the
RIAA stuck to the position it held over the previous
decade, many additional webcaster bankruptcies and
relocations abroad would have occurred as a direct
result of performance royalty fees set at a level far
above that for the public performance (digital or
otherwise) of musical compositions.
While Congress is partly responsible for its
decision to instruct the CARP to set a rate on an
ambiguous "willing buyer/willing seller" metric, 249the
RIAA bears much of the blame for its distortion of
that standard by overestimating the value of the
digital public performance license. The experience
of fledgling webcasters before a politically powerful
recording industry demonstrates the importance of
setting any new performance royalty at a genuinely
reasonable rate.
3. A New Public Performance
RightWould Impose Undue
Costs on the Public's Right of
Access to Sound Recordings
The age-old response to the incentive
argument for a new performance rationale, as
described in Part II.A.3, is to emphasize the
countervailing costs of the copyright monopoly on
the public's right of access to information. Because
information (here, music) is a public good,250 its use
by one party does not affect any other party's
simultaneous or future use. In light of this reality,
the creation of property rights in information
imposes a burden on the public. 2s ' The Copyright
Clause of the Constitution explicitly recognizes the
danger of such costs, insisting that the grant of the
copyright monopoly be tethered to some
concomitant public benefit (i.e., the development of
future works).12 In accordance with this basic
constitutional principle, opponents of a general public
performance right could argue that the costs
imposed on the public would outweigh any alleged
incentive effect.
A wise strategy for broadcasters would be
to attempt a subtle argument, depicting their position
''not as a squabble over who would get the benefit
of existing works," but rather as a genuine resolution
of the "conflict between creation and use. '25 On
the creation side, broadcasters could rely on the
argument, described in Part ll.B. I., that performers
and producers already have the necessary incentive
to create recordings due to the promise of CD sales.
Pointing to the vast quantity of recorded music,
254
they could consequently argue that any additional
incentive effect would be unnecessary. On the
burden side, however, broadcasters could decry the
alleged effects of a new right on the broadcasting
industry's competitive welfare, as described above
in Part Il.B.2.
The strength and credibility of the social
costs claim is entirely dependent on the
broadcasters' ability to establish its other primary
arguments. Like the recording industry's opposing
incentive argument, the social costs rationale is thus
unlikely to be persuasive on its own right. Yet backed
by the inertia of the status quo, this argument could
be helpful in persuading policymakers to oppose any
new performance right in sound recordings.
In the sound recording performance rights
debate, positions advocated by broadcasters are the
polar opposite of those taken by recording artists
and labels. Considering all the factors, it is likely
that neither claim is entirely meritorious. Both are
too extreme to be supported by available evidence.
Radio broadcasters ignore what would
amount to at least some international harmonization
and added foreign royalties, as well as the potential
creation of new works that would not be
economically viable without a performance royalty.
Furthermore, broadcasters fail to adequately account
for the possible inequity of granting performance
royalties to those who compose music but not to
the artists and record labels who help bring that
music to life. Lastly, claims of an inability to afford
any new performance royalty seem hollow
considering the strength of the newly consolidated
American radio industry.
On the other extreme, supporters of a
performance right in
sound recordings have




royalty effects of the
right, given that many
countries could choose
to opt-out of the Rome
Co nventi on's
performance royalty
obligations if faced with
HIJS!
a sudden upsurge in the outflow of payments to the
U.S.2 5 The recording industry's otherwise viable
fairness arguments are diluted by the widespread
practice of payola, demonstrating that radio airplay
serves a key promotional benefit for the sale of new
sound recordings. Also, supporters of a new
performance right have not yet indicated the size of
the corresponding royalty rate. That omission is not
insignificant. An excessive rate could lead to socially
harmful industry exit, as evidenced by the precedent
of the RIAA's treatment of fledgling webcasters.
While it is evident that neither side's position
is entirely accurate, one thing is clear: currently,
broadcasters are winning the debate over
performance rights in sound recordings. As discussed
in Part I.B.2, the adoption of a digital performance
right in sound recordings did not provide a significant
net gain to artists and labels. Although the digital
performance royalty has likely been set at a rate
that overcompensates for the substitution effect,
2 6
the excess performance royalties do not amount to
the roughly $300 million paid out each year by
broadcasters to the copyright owners of musical
compositions.2s7 It is therefore not appropriate to
rely on the digital performance right in gauging the
status of the debate regarding general performance
royalties for traditional methods of public
performance.
Congress should pass an amendment to the
Copyright Act approaching, but not reaching, a
general performance right in sound recordings.
While reform is warranted, U.S. copyright law should
not succumb to the efforts of the recording industry
to achieve an unencumbered general performance
right in sound recordings. Only a performance right
that recognizes the value of radio airplay to the
standard business plan of record companies, and that
closely mirrors the structure of the performance
royalty for musical compositions, can be justified on
an equitable basis. Congress should repeal section
I 14(a) of the Copyright Act and enact a public
performance right in sound recordings, yet ought
do so only if limiting that right with a compulsory
license, a ceiling on the royalty rate tethered to that
charged for the ASCAP/BMI musical composition
licenses, and a statutory "safe harbor" during which
period new sound recordings could be publicly
performed without remuneration to record labels
or artists.
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